United's approach does not vary much when they step from Premier League to Champions League. That seamlessness was achieved only after prolonged angst. Ferguson, after all, had soon discovered that the manner in which the Champions League was won so memorably in 1999 would never do as a standard operating procedure. "We got battered on the counterattack by Anderlecht and PSV," he said last week, thinking of away defeats in the group stage in the autumn of 2000. "Teams had worked us out quite easily. We were a complete 4-4-2 team, relying on the wide players to do a lot of defending for us and attack. We got strung out in those games, so we had to start thinking about playing three central midfielders to make sure we were not exposed like that again."
for about 9 minutes at the camp nou, everything was going to plan for alex ferguson. barcelona were teetering, slightly unsettled and shaky; a valdes spill almost conceded a goal; ronaldo was prominent against that dubious backline. as it would turn out, those 9 minutes were the most enjoyable for alex ferguson. a quick run, a pass slide through the right channel; a sharp turn, a shot snatched instantly; a weak hand, hopes extinguished.
as someone who had tabbed united to win, i watched those 81 minutes in a haze of disbelief and frustration and wonderment. barcelona simply brushed ferguson's men aside, their passing as delicate and precise as united's was ragged and hopeless; it quite quickly devolved into a laughable mismatch.
the manner of the defeat has prompted a variety of bombastic headlines, almost cathartic in their earnest, congratulatory applause of barcelona's victory - by turns, united were outclassed, given a footballing lesson, their midfielders mediocre, their strikers out of position, their defenders overrated. but in picking their angle - catastrophy, adulation - the majority of the media seem to have overlooked two things: firstly that the game was appalling, the unremitting bleakness of the spectacle only punctuated by the sobering lack of competitiveness, and second that the sheer awfulness of manchester united exaggerated any supposed brilliance of barcelona.
simply put, they're not that good. and united aren't that bad.
as soon as the final whistle blew, sid lowe was busy posting an article on the guardian claiming with the victory, barca had "joined the greats". piffle. ultimately, manchester united were hamstrung by crucial injuries and their tactically-challenged manager deciding that the most hyped showpiece final in quite some time was the opportunity for him to surprise everyone with his genius. it wasn't, and united lost.
united's problem was one of tactics rather than playing personnel. as expected, ryan giggs was drafted in to replace darren fletcher. it wasn't a like for like replacement, and united were always going to miss the scotsman's graft and determination, but no matter: giggs would slot into a 3 in midfield and help united keep the ball in possession, and maintain a decent shape when barca had it. ferguson had other ideas, pushing giggs high up the pitch, joining ronaldo in attack to shift the side in a 442.
it was a disastrous decision. most importantly, it allowed barcelona, already the world's best team in possession, additional time and space on the ball. xavi and iniesta are already probably the world's best two midfielders, but the presence of busquets alongside them meant it was 3 of them and 2 of united; a more unfair duel one cannot imagine. carrick and anderson were doomed, the barca midfield simply playing it around them when they decided to press and playing it across them when they decided to sit. this also meant that too often, park would get sucked inside to pick up a central midfielder as united were overwhelmed, providing not only an easy outlet pass to sylvinho but just another opportunity for barca to deform their rickety defensive shape; it also handicapped united in possession, depleting their options in midfield against a side who are adept at pressing high up the pitch. passes began to fall away, and united simply got more ragged, more hopeless as the match went on, barca deftly manoeuvreing around united's rearguard as they picked off pass after pass.
the problem was fundamental and never addressed: ferguson's answer was to bring on strikers, first tevez, and then berbatov, at the expense of anderson and giggs respectively. the removal of anderson was particularly baffling as united couldn't cope in midfield anyway; they proceeded to struggle even more. against a side of such footballing genius, it was criminal. iniesta, who was by far the best player on display (even if thursday's hagiographies followed the predictable "messi defeats ronaldo" route), danced across the olympic stadium's turf, tearing united to shreds.
this wasn't a challenge, any more than the average la liga game was a challenge. united stood off and did everything barca wanted them to do, and got slaughtered. chelsea, on the other hand, established that blueprint to nullify barcelona, harrying them, pressing them, stifling them, intimidating them. guardiola showed his lack of tactical prowess by mishandling messi during that game, but united did nothing to even test this; barcelona simply played their own serene game. just as there are other matches you should look at to analyse the merits of anderson and carrick (very good players), or the benefits of playing rooney as a left-sided attacker (legion), or the importance of darren fletcher (high), so there are better games to judge the true brilliance of this barcelona side. the fawning needs to stop: this was a victory directly facilitated by the poor management of alex ferguson, and one not likely to be repeated. well, not least for another 8 years or so.
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